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INTEREST OF AMICI
Amici are law professors and practicing lawyers
who study restitution, remedies, or both. One amicus
was the Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, and eight served as
Advisers or on the Members Consultative Group for
that Restatement. Individual amici are further
identified in the Appendix.1
If this Court were to adopt petitioner’s proposed
rule — that a plaintiff who suffers no harm beyond the
loss of his legal rights has no standing to sue — it
could wreak havoc with the law of restitution and
unjust enrichment, barring many long-established
causes of action from federal courts. This important
body of law long predates the American founding and
serves essential functions, especially in private law
but in parts of public law as well.
These amici take no position on the underlying
statutory claim.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner’s sweeping and ill-defined argument
that no plaintiff can have standing without proof of
This brief was prepared entirely by amici and their counsel.
No other person made any financial contribution to its preparation or submission. Consent letters are submitted with the
brief.
The American Law Institute speaks only through its Restatements and similar projects. Each such project is repeatedly
revised in light of detailed reviews by multiple groups of judges,
practitioners, and academics. Each position taken is supported
by cases cited in the reporter’s notes. Finally, each project must
be approved by the Institute’s governing Council and separately
by its membership. This brief did not go through these processes;
it is not a statement of the American Law Institute.
1

1

“concrete harm” is aimed at claims for statutory minimum damages. The Court should reject this frontal
assault on statutory remedies. But whatever the
Court does with respect to statutory damages, it
should take care not to inadvertently sweep away
much of the law of restitution.
1. The law of restitution and unjust enrichment
creates remedies and causes of action based on gain to
defendant rather than loss to plaintiff. It follows that
in appropriate cases, courts may impose liability for
unjust enrichment even though the wrong that is the
basis for plaintiff’s claim caused no harm. It is enough
that defendant’s gain derived from a violation of
plaintiff’s rights. Moreover, plaintiffs to whom a fiduciary or confidential duty is owed can sue to set aside
conflicted transactions without alleging or proving
either damages to themselves or gain to defendant.
Such remedies and causes of action have been part of
Anglo-American law since before the American
founding.
Only one person has standing to sue under the
slayer rule, but that plaintiff need not even allege a
violation of his own rights. There are also tort claims
that are actionable without harm — trespass, trespass to chattels, assault, battery, and false imprisonment.
Even more at odds with petitioner’s theory, private
litigants at the founding could recover statutory
damages or penalties in an action of debt, without
proof of actual damages.
2. Standing necessarily depends on the relief
sought. Plaintiffs may have standing to sue for damages but not standing to sue for an injunction, or vice
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versa. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
And plaintiffs may have standing to sue for restitution
of unjust enrichment without having standing to sue
for damages or an injunction.
Standing to sue in unjust enrichment requires
plaintiff to show that he is the source of defendant’s
enrichment, either in the sense that he suffered a loss
that corresponds to defendant’s gain, or in the sense
that defendant’s gain was acquired by violating
plaintiff’s rights. These rules are deeply embedded in
the substantive law of restitution, and only occasionally are they labeled as standing rules. But they serve
the function of standing rules: they confine the right
to sue to identifiable individuals with a concrete stake
in the litigation.
Congress cannot authorize individual plaintiffs to
enforce generalized rights that belong to the whole
public. But Congress can create new individualized
rights, and it can enact effective remedies for those
rights. Standing to sue for statutory minimum
damages requires violation of an individualized
statutory right personal to plaintiff. The “injury in
fact” that is “the irreducible constitutional minimum
of standing” is “invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
Additional or consequential harms are not required.
3. Petitioner never specifies what it means by
injury or harm. It acknowledges standing in many
cases based only on violation of an individualized legal
right, without proof of any further harm. It appears to
say that standing on this basis is acceptable for
common-law rights but not for statutory rights. Its
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position reduces to little more than hostility to legislatures and to the statute it has allegedly violated.
ARGUMENT
I. Standing Often Does Not Require Plaintiffs
to Establish Any Harm Beyond the Violation
of Their Legal Rights.
As further explained in Part III, petitioner’s
understandings of “injury” and “harm” are undefined,
shifting, and inconsistent. But the heart of petitioner’s
argument is that loss of respondent’s statutory rights
is not an injury that will support standing. Some
additional or consequential harm is required. Pet. Br.
14-17.
Petitioner’s approach cannot even explain the law
of damages. It is utterly inconsistent with the law of
restitution and unjust enrichment.
A. Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Is
Based on Defendant’s Gain, Not Plaintiff’s
Loss.
Compensatory damages, based on plaintiff’’s loss,
and restitution of unjust enrichment, based on defendant’s gain, are fundamentally distinct. See, e.g.,
Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,
534 U.S. 204, 215 (2002) (contrasting restitution with
damages). The remedies and the causes of action have
different conceptual bases, different histories, and different measures of recovery.
These differences are long established and uncontroversial. As summarized in the standard treatises,
“[R]estitution is measured by the defendant’s gains,
not by the plaintiff’s losses.” 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of
Remedies §1.1 at 5 (2d ed. 1993). “[I]n the damage
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action the plaintiff seeks to recover for the harm done
to him, whereas in the restitution action he seeks to
recover the gain acquired by the defendant through
the wrongful act.” 1 George E. Palmer, The Law of
Restitution §2.1 at 51 (1978).
Often, an unjust gain to defendant will be matched
by a corresponding loss to plaintiff. If $100 is misappropriated, or paid by mistake, defendant has gained
$100 and plaintiff has lost $100. But sometimes,
plaintiff’s loss is smaller than defendant’s gain. And
sometimes, plaintiff has no economic loss at all. Such
a plaintiff may still have a claim in restitution,
because the basis of the claim is defendant’s gain, not
plaintiff’s loss.
The new Restatement summarizes the basic
principle as its predecessors summarized it: “A person
who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is
subject to liability in restitution.” Restatement (Third)
of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §1 (2011) (hereinafter Restatement (Third)). 2 It further explains in
the first paragraph of the first Comment:
While the paradigm case of unjust enrichment
is one in which the benefit on one side of the
transaction corresponds to an observable loss
on the other, the consecrated formula “at the
expense of another” can also mean “in violation
of the other’s legally protected rights,” without
the need to show that the claimant has suffered
a loss. See §3.
Restatement (Third) §1 cmt. a (emphasis added).

Accord, Restatement (Second) of Restitution §1 (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1983); Restatement of Restitution §1 (1937).
2
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Section 3, also closely tracking its predecessors,
says simply that “A person is not permitted to profit
by his own wrong.” The first Comment makes two
important points about this principle. First:
The present section marks one of the cornerstones of the law of restitution and unjust
enrichment. The general principle it identifies
is the one underlying the “disgorgement”
remedies in restitution, whereby a claimant
potentially recovers more than a provable loss
so that the defendant may be stripped of a
wrongful gain.
Id. §3 cmt. a.
Second, the broad principle that no man may profit
by his own wrong “identifies an outlook and an
objective, not a cause of action.” Ibid. “Working rules”
that define specific causes of action come in later
sections.
B. Many Familiar Causes of Action for
Unjust Enrichment Do Not Require Plaintiffs to Establish Harm Beyond the Violation of Their Legal Rights.
Many familiar causes of action can support a restiutionary remedy in which plaintiff recovers defendant’s unjust enrichment based on violation of a
legally protected right, without the plaintiff having to
establish any further harm. In some of these cases, it
is clear that plaintiff suffered no harm beyond the loss
of his rights. In others, plaintiff may or may not have
suffered further harm, but he need not allege or prove
any such harm.
A word about terminology: Some opinions rather
clearly say that defendant’s violation of plaintiff’s
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legal rights is an injury to plaintiff, even though plaintiff cannot establish any further harm. See, e.g.,
Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652, 654 (Wash.
1946). These opinions define injury as violation of a
right. In every case in which a person’s legal right is
violated, he has lost at least the entitlement created
by that right.
Other opinions equate injury with further or consequential harm. These opinions rather clearly say that
plaintiff can recover defendant’s unjust enrichment
without proof of any injury. See, e.g., Jackson v.
Smith, 254 U.S. 586, 589 (1921). The result is the
same under either explanation: plaintiff can sue for
defendant’s unjust enrichment without establishing
any harm beyond the violation of his legal rights.
1. Commercial Bribes and Kickbacks.
An employer can recover any bribe or kickback
paid to his employee, without establishing that the
quality of the employee’s services or the terms of any
transaction were actually affected. The rule is the
same for a client who is entitled to honest and loyal
services from a professional or a service provider.
Restatement (Third) §43 illus. 17-19 & reporter’s note
d; id. §44 illus. 9 & reporter’s note b; Restatement
(Third) of Agency §8.02 and cmt. b (2006) (“it is not
necessary that the principal show that the agent’s
acquisition of a material benefit harmed the
principal.”).
As the Minnesota court explained:
It matters not that the principal has
suffered no damage or even that the transaction has been profitable to him. …
“Actual injury is not the principle the law

7

proceeds on, in holding such transactions void.
Fidelity in the agent is what is aimed at, and,
as a means of securing it, the law will not permit him to place himself in a position in which
he may be tempted by his own private interests
to disregard those of his principal.”
Tarnowski v. Resop, 51 N.W.2d 801, 803 (Minn. 1952)
(quoting Lum v. McEwen (Lum v. Clark), 57 N.W. 662,
662-63 (Minn. 1894)).
Governments are frequent plaintiffs in such cases.
See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 305-09
(1910); United States v. Podell, 572 F.2d 31, 34-35 (2d
Cir. 1978).
2. Business Opportunities.
Another example, with ancient roots, is trustees or
agents who take for themselves business opportunities that might have been of interest to their beneficiaries or principals.
This body of law appears to have been well
established by the time of Keech v. Sandford, 25 Eng.
Rep. 223 (Ch. 1726). A landlord refused to renew a
lease to a trust for a minor; he then leased the
property to the trustee individually. “[T]here was
clear proof of the refusal to renew for the benefit of the
infant,” id. at 223, and the Chancellor did not doubt
the fact. So the minor had not lost the lease due to any
action by the trustee.
The minor had suffered no harm unless violation
of his right to the trustee’s undivided loyalty counts as
harm. But the absence of harm could not change the
result: “it is very proper that rule should be strictly
pursued, and not in the least relaxed.” Ibid.
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From these beginnings, there has grown the whole
modern law of corporate opportunities. Directors, officers, agents, partners, and the like cannot take for
themselves a business opportunity that might have
been of interest to their principal. Those who do are
liable to the principal for all their profits from the
opportunity. Plaintiff need not show that it would
have invested in the opportunity itself, and therefore,
it need not show that it was harmed. Restatement
(Third) §43 illus. 14-15 and reporter’s note d;
Restatement (Third) of Agency §8.02 and cmt. d and
reporter’s note d; American Law Institute, Principles
of Corporate Governance §5.05, §5.12, and reporter’s
notes (1992). For modern variations on Keech, see
Restatement (Third) §43 illus. 1 and reporter’s note b.
A famous illustration is Judge Cardozo’s opinion in
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). The
opportunity there was to take a lease on a much larger
tract, for a much longer term, requiring much more
capital, than the original lease in the joint venture
between the parties. Id. at 545-46. But it was not for
defendant to decide whether his joint venturer would
have been willing and able to participate. “No answer
is it to say that the chance would have been of little
value even if seasonably offered.” Id. at 547. One who
improperly takes a business opportunity for himself is
liable for his profits, whether or not the victim was
harmed.
3. Other Conflicts of Interest.
The rule that applies to bribes and kickbacks and
to corporate opportunities applies with equal rigor to
other transactions conducted under the potential
influence of a conflict of interest. The principal or
beneficiary in such a case can recover the unjust
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enrichment of his agent or trustee without proof of
harm. Or, because proof of defendant’s gain is often
difficult, he can sue to rescind or set aside the transaction without proving either harm to plaintiff or gain
to defendant. Restatement (Third) of Agency §8.01
cmt. d(1) and reporter’s note d(1) (summarizing both
remedies).
Thus, it is a settled rule, again with ancient roots,
that a receiver or trustee of the assets of an insolvent
debtor cannot buy at his own sale, even if the sale is
conducted at public auction and the trustee is the high
bidder. Restatement (Third) §43 illus. 20 & reporter’s
note d; Whelpdale v. Cookson, 27 Eng. Rep. 856 (Ch.
1747).
A revealing example in this Court is Jackson v.
Smith, 254 U.S. 586 (1921). The Court said that “it
affirmatively appears that the sale was fairly conducted, that there was competitive bidding, and that the
property was finally knocked down to the highest
bidder.” Id. at 587. But this high bidder was a group
that included the trustee responsible for the sale, and
the group went on to make profits with the property it
had purchased. The Court unanimously held that the
trustee and his confederates were liable “for all the
profits obtained by him and those who were associated
with him in the matter, although the estate may not
have been injured thereby.” Id. at 589 (emphasis
added).
Another striking example is Mosser v. Darrow, 341
U.S. 267 (1951). There, the employees of a reorganization trustee traded in the securities of the enterprise undergoing reorganization. The trustee who
employed them and allowed them to trade was held
personally liable for their profits, although he had not
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traded for his own account and had no improper
profits of his own. The trustee argued that his
employees had caused no loss, and even that their
purchases of securities had supported the price and
been beneficial to the reorganizing enterprise. Id. at
272. The Court was not so sure of that, but its holding
was that it did not matter. Id. at 273. The estate could
recover the profits of a conflicted transaction, whether
or not it had suffered any harm.
Another variation arises when an agent or trustee
borrows assets of the principal or of the trust, and uses
those assets to profit personally. The borrower is
liable for his profits even if he repays the loan with
interest and no harm is done. A clear example is Slay
v. Burnett Trust, 187 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1945). The
trustees borrowed money from the trust to invest personally in a speculative venture. They gave an
interest-bearing note secured by oil and gas interests,
id. at 385, and they had repaid most of the loan by the
time of trial, id. at 387. Almost certainly the speculative investment would have been inappropriate for
the trust. But the trustees were liable to the trust for
their profits, because they had improperly used trust
assets to make these profits. Id. at 387-89.
Similarly if a corporate officer uses any of the
corporation’s property for his own benefit, he is liable
to the corporation for any resulting profit, whether or
not the corporation is harmed. Principles of Corporate
Governance §5.04(a), (c) and reporter’s note 2.
4. Misuse of Confidential Information.
A person who misuses confidential information is
liable for any profits he makes as a result — whether
or not the person entitled to control the information
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can show harm. An example in this Court is Snepp v.
United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), where a CIA agent
published a book about his work without submitting
the manuscript for review by the agency. The government made no effort to prove damages. The Court
believed the government had been harmed but that
any damages were “unquantifiable.” Id. at 514. The
Court granted a constructive trust over the profits
from the book.
The rule is the same in more prosaic contexts such
as trade secrets. One who misappropriates a trade
secret is liable for his profits, whether or not plaintiff
suffers any damages. Uniform Trade Secrets Act
§3(a), 14 Unif. Laws Ann. 633 (2005).
Civil liability for insider trading depends on this
principle. When the insider uses corporate information to profit by trading in the corporation’s
securities, the corporation can recover those profits
without pleading or proving any harm. Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969);
Restatement (Third) §43 illus. 9 and reporter’s note c;
Principles of Corporate Governance §5.04(a), (c). The
cause of action is to recover defendant’s profits, see,
e.g., SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1998),
and it is probably rare for the corporation to have any
compensable loss.
5. Forfeiture of Fees.
An agent, attorney, or other person in a confidential relationship who breaches a duty of loyalty
may forfeit fees to which he would otherwise be
entitled. Restatement (Third) of Agency §8.01 cmt. d(2)
and reporter’s note d(2); Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers §37 and reporter’s notes a, e
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(2000). If the client has already paid those fees, he
may sue to recover them. Id. cmt. a. The fiduciary
would be unjustly enriched if he retained fees that he
had forfeited by his disloyalty.
When the client sues to recover the fees, he need
not show that the disloyal act caused harm. See, e.g.,
Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 237-40 (Tex. 1999);
see id. at 239 nn.36-37 (collecting authorities).
6. Infringement of Intellectual Property.
One who infringes a copyright, trademark, or trade
secret is liable for either his own profits or the victim’s
losses. 17 U.S.C. §504(b) (copyright); 15 U.S.C.
§1117(a) (trademark); Uniform Trade Secrets Act
§3(a) (trade secret). Liability for profits has been
repealed in patent infringement, 35 U.S.C. §284,
except for design patents, §289, for policy reasons
unrelated to standing.
If the infringer takes sales away from the victim of
infringement, plaintiff will have losses and defendant
will have gains that may be either more or less than
plaintiff’s damages. Plaintiff can generally sue for
whichever is larger.
If the infringer expands the market, or creates a
derivative work that is infringing but not duplicative,
he may earn substantial profits without causing
plaintiff to lose any sales. In such a case, plaintiff can
recover defendant’s profits without showing any
harm. Restatement (Third) §42 illus. 7-9 and reporter’s note g.
A copyright example is Three Boys Music Corp. v.
Bolton, 212 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2000), where defendant
produced a hit song in 1991 that infringed another hit
from 1964. The infringer was liable for the portion of
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his profits attributable to the infringement. But it is
hard to imagine that plaintiff lost any sales of its 1964
song to a “similar” song in 1991.
A leading trademark example is Maier Brewing
Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117 (9th
Cir. 1968), where the sellers of an inexpensive beer
copied the trademark of a well known scotch whisky.
The infringers profited from their infringement, but
plaintiff did not claim that it had lost any sales of
whisky. Defendants plausibly argued that plaintiffs
had shown “no injury to themselves, no diversion of
sales from them to the appellants, no direct
competition from which injury may be inferable.” Id.
at 120. Even so, defendants had to disgorge their
profits.
The leading case in this Court is Sheldon v. MetroGoldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390 (1940), where
MGM plagiarized the script of a play and made a
major movie. Damages to the copyright holder might
have been zero, and were at most quite modest
compared to the profits from the movie. The Court
affirmed plaintiff’s judgment for 20% of the profits
from the movie, based on the lower court’s estimate of
the highest proportion of the profits that might
possibly have been attributable to the script. Id. at
408-09.
Recovery of the infringer’s profits is sufficiently
settled that although this Court decides many
intellectual property cases, it has not returned to
issues of how to measure the profits. Sheldon cites
numerous earlier cases. See also Petrella v. MetroGoldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1967 & n.1,
1973 (2014) (discussing the profits remedy in
copyright); Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Manufac-
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turing Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203 (1942)
(trademark).
7. Trespass.
A trespasser is liable for compensatory damages,
for nominal damages in the absence of any actual
damage, infra at 19, or for the profits of the trespass,
Restatement (Third) §40 and reporter’s note c.
There are well known examples where the trespass
was harmless, because plaintiff was not using his
property or could not use his property. But he could
still recover the trespasser’s profits. In Raven Red Ash
Coal Co. v. Ball, 39 S.E.2d 231 (Va. 1946), defendant
had an easement to build a railroad across plaintiff’s
land and to transport coal mined from specified tracts
of land. Without authorization, defendant also transported coal from additional tracts. Defendant argued
that the only remedy should be nominal damages for
the tort. The court disagreed, awarding instead the
value of the benefit wrongfully acquired:
To limit plaintiff to the recovery of nominal
damages for the repeated trespasses will enable
defendant, as a trespasser, to obtain a more
favorable position than a party contracting for
the same right. Natural justice plainly requires
the law to imply a promise to pay a fair value of
the benefits received. Defendant's estate has
been enhanced by just this much.
Id. at 238; Restatement (Third) §40 illus. 2.
Another well known example is Edwards v. Lee’s
Administrator, 96 S.W.2d 1028 (Ky. 1936); Restatement (Third) §40 illus. 4, §51 illus. 13. Edwards, who
owned the mouth of the Great Onyx Cave, developed
the cave as a tourist attraction. About one-third of the
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cave was under Lee’s land — 360 feet below the
surface and inaccessible to Lee. 96 S.W.2d at 1030.
The court did not find any damages; instead, it
awarded one-third of the profits from the cave. “[W]e
are led inevitably to the conclusion that the measure
of recovery in this case must be the benefits, or net
profits, received by the appellants from the use of the
property of the appellees.” Id. at 1032. Reviewing
similar cases from various contexts, the court said:
“The philosophy of all these decisions is that a wrongdoer shall not be permitted to make a profit from his
own wrong.” Ibid.
8. Conversion.
Similar facts can arise in conversion. Restatement
(Third) §40 and reporter’s note d. A well known
example is Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652
(Wash. 1946). Defendant “borrowed” plaintiff’s
egg-washing machine, without authorization, and
used it in his business for more than three years until
discovered. Plaintiff had stored the machine in space
adjacent to defendant’s business, had no current use
for it, and did not know it was missing. Defendant
plausibly argued that plaintiff had suffered no loss.
The court said that the violation of plaintiff’s
rights was in itself an injury. Id. at 654. But the
remedy it affirmed was restitution, not damages: the
court awarded defendant’s profits from using the
machine. “To hold otherwise would be subversive of
all property rights since his use was admittedly
wrongful and without claim of right. The theory of
unjust enrichment is applicable in such a case.” Ibid;
Restatement (Third) §40 illus. 17.
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9. Rescission.
Rescission is another familiar restitutionary
remedy that need not be accompanied by harm. If one
party repudiates a contract, or substantially fails to
perform, the other party is entitled to its money back,
even if performance would have been worthless and
contract damages would have been zero. Mobil Oil
Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United
States, 530 U.S. 604 (2000); Restatement (Third) §37
illus. 1. After reviewing the underlying principles, 530
U.S. at 607-08, the Court in Mobil turned to the facts.
The government convincingly argued that Mobil had
suffered no harm, but the Court said that did not
matter.
This argument, however, misses the basic legal
point. The oil companies do not seek damages
for breach of contract. They seek restitution of
their initial payments. Because the Government repudiated the lease contracts, the law
entitles the companies to that restitution
whether the contracts would, or would not,
ultimately have produced a financial gain or led
them to obtain a definite right to explore. If a
lottery operator fails to deliver a purchased
ticket, the purchaser can get his money back —
whether or not he eventually would have won
the lottery.
Id. at 623-24.
10. The Slayer Rule.
If a person who would inherit property on the
death of another feloniously kills that other person,
the slayer does not get to keep the property he
inherits. Restatement (Third) §45. The rule is the
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same if the slayer would acquire the property through
life insurance, joint tenancy, or any other means by
which property passes at death. Ibid.
The property passes instead to the person next in
line, usually the person who would have inherited the
property if the slayer had predeceased the victim.
§45(3). That person had no legally protected interest
at common law, and very often, he has no compensable
injury and no legally protected interest under the
wrongful death act. He may be an adult child of the
victim, a sibling, a nephew, or a third cousin once
removed. If he was not financially dependent on the
victim, and not on the short list of other potential
plaintiffs listed in the wrongful death acts of some
states, he cannot sue for damages. But he can recover
the slayer’s unjust enrichment.
It is unimaginable that this body of law, partly
judge-made and partly statutory, would be held
unconstitutional. Yet the cause of action is vested in a
substitute heir or beneficiary who often has suffered
no legally cognizable harm. The purpose of the cause
of action is to deprive the slayer of his unjust gains,
the claim is vested in the most appropriate plaintiff,
and that plaintiff has a concrete personal stake in the
litigation. The slayer’s enrichment is at plaintiff’s
expense only in the sense that this plaintiff will
inherit if the slayer cannot.
*****
The point of all these examples is that plaintiffs
who suffered no harm beyond the violation of their
legal rights can often sue to recover or prevent
defendant’s unjust enrichment. Large, diverse, and
important areas of law would be thrown into confusion
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by an opinion suggesting that an unjust enrichment
plaintiff must establish harm to have standing to sue
in federal court.
C. Some Torts Are Actionable for Damages
Without Evidence of Harm Beyond the
Violation of Plaintiff’s Rights.
As respondent explains, many common-law claims
are actionable for damages without harm in petitioner’s apparent sense of the word. Resp. Br. 16-22.
We offer additional examples and authorities. “[A]ny
intrusion upon land in the possession of another is an
injury, and, if not privileged, gives rise to a cause of
action even though the intrusion is beneficial, or so
transitory that it constitutes no interference with or
detriment to the land or its beneficial enjoyment.”
Restatement (Second) of Torts §7 cmt. a (1965); see also
id. reporter’s note d; id. §158, §163; 1 Dan B. Dobbs et
al., The Law of Torts §56 at 149 (2d ed. 2011).
Similarly, the action for trespass to chattels will lie
for temporary dispossession “although there has been
no impairment of the condition, quality, or value of the
chattel, and no other harm to any interest of the
possessor,” and “he is not deprived of the use of the
chattel for any substantial length of time.”
Restatement (Second) of Torts §218 cmt. d.
False imprisonment is actionable if the plaintiff
either “is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by
it.” Id. §35(1)(c).
Assault is to intentionally cause apprehension of
either “a harmful or offensive contact.” Id. §21(a).
Battery can be either “a harmful or offensive contact
with the person.” Id. §18(1)(a). And as Professor
Dobbs reads the cases, “offensive” means no more
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than without actual or apparent consent. Dobbs, Torts
§33 at 81-82. The touching is offensive because
defendant overrode plaintiff’s objection.
In each of these intentional torts to the person,
plaintiff may “recover substantial as distinct from
nominal damages” without proof of either physical
harm or emotional distress. “The invasion of the
plaintiff’s rights is regarded as a harm in itself and
subject to an award of damages.” Id. §47 at 120.
D. These Causes of Action Long Predate the
American Founding.
Some of these claims, without harm in petitioner’s
sense, long predate the American founding. Keech v.
Sandford, supra at 8, holding a trustee liable for
taking an opportunity that the trust could not have
taken in any event, was decided in 1726. And the
Chancellor treated the rule as already settled.
Whelpdale v. Cookson, 27 Eng. Rep. 856 (Ch. 1747),
where a trustee was the high bidder at his own public
sale, set aside the sale without proof of either harm to
plaintiff or profit to the trustee. The facts are more
fully stated in Whelpdale v. Cookson, 28 Eng. Rep. 440
(Ch. 1747), where the reporter says that “This
doctrine is not confined to Trustees, but extends to
Assignees under Commissions of Bankrupt, Solicitors,
Agents, and in short all persons having a confidential
character,” citing numerous cases. Id. at 441.
The reporter also notes that the authority of
Whelpdale had “been doubted” by Lord Eldon in Ex
parte Lacey, 31 Eng. Rep. 1228, 1229 (Ch. 1802). Lord
Eldon’s “doubt” was that Whelpdale had not gone far
enough. Whelpdale said that a majority of the creditors could ratify a sale to a trustee who bought at his
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own sale. But Lord Eldon insisted that only unanimous consent of all the creditors could ratify such a
sale.
The Chancellors discussed these cases as a recurring problem. Those who had been deprived of their
right to undivided loyalty could sue without more,
because proof of actual injury or profit was too difficult. As Lord Eldon explained:
[The rule] is founded upon this; that though you
may see in a particular case, that he has not
made advantage, it is utterly impossible to
examine upon satisfactory evidence in the
power of the Court, by which I mean, in the
power of the parties, in ninety-nine cases out of
an hundred, whether he has made advantage,
or not.
Lacey, 31 Eng. Rep. at 1229.
So the courts dispensed with proof of loss to
plaintiff; they dispensed even with proof of gain to
defendant. It was enough to support a cause of action
that defendant violated a duty of loyalty.
E. Founding-Era Plaintiffs Could Recover
Statutory Damages or Penalties Without
Evidence of Harm.
Even more fundamentally at odds with petitioner’s
theory, statutes often enacted civil penalties for
various wrongs. Private plaintiffs could recover these
penalties in an action of debt. Tull v. United States,
481 U.S. 412, 418 (1987); F.W. Maitland, The Forms
of Action at Common Law 52 (1968 reprint) (debt
“serves for the recovery of statutory penalties”).3 The
3

Tull cites Calcraft v. Gibbs, 101 Eng. Rep. 11 (K.B. 1792),
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one “untranscendible limit” of an action of debt was
that “the claim must be for a fixed sum.” Id. at 51.
Plaintiffs in such cases could recover only the fixed
statutory sum; any actual damages were irrelevant.
The First Congress provided that copyright
holders could recover, in an “action of debt,” fifty cents
for every infringing page found in an infringer’s
possession. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning
§2, 1 Stat. 124, 124-25 (1790). So the remedy applied
only to pages that had not been sold or distributed.
Plaintiff could also recover and destroy these pages,
ibid, so they never would be sold or distributed. So it
is not just that no harm was required. Resp. Br. 2223. These pages would never do harm, but plaintiff
could recover the statutory sum in an action of debt.
Congress may have assumed that often there were
other pages that had been sold, and that but for the
lawsuit, some of the destroyed pages would have been
sold. But Congress no doubt made similar assumptions about the harm of publishing false information
about individuals. Both statutes may have presumed
harm, but neither required evidence of harm.
F. Petitioner’s Proposed Rule — Especially If
Broadly Stated — Would Disrupt Large
Bodies of Long-Established Law.
All these causes of action — for restitution without
harm, for damages without harm, for statutory
penalties without harm — were part of “the
traditional concern of the courts at Westminster.” Pet.
and Atcheson v. Everitt, 98 Eng. Rep. 1142 (K.B. 1775); see also
Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law
363 (5th ed. 1956) (debt lay “to enforce various statutory
penalties”); id. at 633 (same).
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Br. 18. They present traditional cases and controversies.
Petitioner rejects standing for any plaintiff who
suffers no harm beyond the violation of his legal
rights. This argument directly jeopardizes all statutes
that provide minimum statutory recoveries. The
danger to the law of restitution and unjust enrichment lies in the potential breadth of an opinion
adopting petitioner’s formulation of standing rules.
Broadly stating petitioner’s rule would overturn
centuries of Anglo-American law. All the cases
discussed above would appear to be barred from
federal court if this Court adopts petitioners’
argument. Where a restitution plaintiff could establish harm, the claim could proceed — but requiring
such proof in a claim for restitution of unjust enrichment would fundamentally change the lawsuit,
adding a previously irrelevant issue to every
plaintiff’s burden of proof.
Many federal claims would be barred or
fundamentally changed — claims to recover bribes
paid to federal employees; claims for infringement of
copyright, trademark, and design patents; claims to
recover the profits of insider trading; claims to recover
insiders’ short-term profits; and more. Many state-law
claims would be barred from the diversity jurisdiction.
Many states have similar standing rules for
litigation in state court, often following or visibly
influenced by this Court’s decisions. 4 Defendants
would argue the persuasive value of this Court’s
A Westlaw search on September 4, 2015 revealed 749 state
supreme court opinions discussing “standing” and “injury in fact”
in the same paragraph.
4
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decision in state court; every state would have to
decide whether to preserve the traditional rules of
restitution and unjust enrichment or to follow this
Court’s lead and bar many such claims. Of course this
Court is not responsible for state law. But the Court
should think carefully before it bars many state-law
claims from federal court and throws large swathes of
state law into potential chaos.
II. The Requirements of Standing Necessarily
Depend on the Relief Plaintiff Seeks.
A plaintiff must show “that he has standing for
each type of relief sought.” Summers v. Earth Island
Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (citing City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983)). This is
because the relevant personal stake necessarily varies
with the type of relief sought. There is no uniform rule
of standing that applies without change to every type
of relief.
A. Standing in Suits for Damages and Injunctions.
In Lyons, plaintiff suffered damages when a
policeman choked him, so he had standing to sue for
damages. But he was not sufficiently threatened with
a repetition to have standing to sue for an injunction.
Many cases are the reverse. A plaintiff who is
threatened with unlawful conduct has standing to sue
for an injunction, but no standing to sue for damages,
because his rights have yet not been violated. Threatened violation of a legal right is not injury in fact until
or unless the right is actually violated. Plaintiffs in
such cases have standing to sue for an injunction or
declaratory judgment because they are threatened
with injury that the court can prevent. See, e.g., Med-
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Immune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
B. Standing in Suits for Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment.
Just as standing to sue for damages is different
from standing to sue for an injunction, so standing to
sue for restitution of unjust enrichment is different
from either. Because claims for unjust enrichment are
based on defendant’s gains rather than plaintiff’s
losses, a focus on harm asks the wrong question. The
basis for standing in claims for restitution of unjust
enrichment is that defendant was enriched “at the
expense of” plaintiff, either in the sense of a corresponding loss to plaintiff and gain to defendant, or in
the sense that defendant’s profits were derived from a
violation of plaintiff’s legally protected rights. Supra
at 5.
This Court considered the standing question in
Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115 (1991). Gollust was a
suit to recover a corporate insider’s short-term trading
profits under §16(b) of the Securities and Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. §78p(b). The statute authorizes the
issuer whose securities are illegally traded to recover
these profits, and it authorizes holders of that issuer’s
securities to recover the profits on behalf of the issuer
if the issuer fails to act.
It is unlikely that the issuer is harmed when one
of its officers or major shareholders buys and sells in
a six-month period, and even less likely that any individual security holder is harmed. Certainly no
plaintiff is required to allege harm. The issuer has
standing to sue because the statute creates the right;
the statute creates the right because of the substantial risk that defendant misused the issuer’s confi-
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dential information to produce his profits. Shareholders have standing on the general principles of
derivative suits.
Gollust held that a derivative plaintiff in a §16(b)
suit must continue to hold his securities in the issuer
throughout the litigation. Otherwise, he would not
have the necessary “personal stake” in the lawsuit
that is essential to Article III standing. 501 U.S. at
125-26. But this “personal stake” was not a matter of
the derivative plaintiff establishing a likelihood, or
even a possibility, that he was harmed. Plaintiff’s
“personal stake” was that “respondent still stands to
profit, albeit indirectly, if this action is successful.” Id.
at 128. “[H]e retains a continuing financial interest in
the outcome of the litigation derived from his stock in
International’s sole stockholder, Viacom, whose only
asset is International.” Id. at 127-28. The decision was
unanimous.
To have standing to sue on a restitutionary claim
for defendant’s wrongful profits, plaintiff had to have
a personal stake in recovering defendant’s profits —
not a personal stake in his own non-existent losses.
Claims in restitution and unjust enrichment are
based on defendant’s gains, and standing depends on
plaintiff’s personal stake in those gains.
It does not follow that just anybody can create a
personal stake by suing to recover a stranger’s unjust
enrichment. The requirement that defendant’s gains
be at plaintiff’s expense is deeply embedded in the law
of restitution. It appears in the black letter of §1 of the
Restatement (Third), and in the formulation of nearly
every substantive rule of restitution and unjust
enrichment. Even in the exceptional case of the slayer
rule, courts carefully identify the appropriate plaintiff

26

entitled to inherit in lieu of the slayer — a choice that
is easy in most cases but difficult in a few. Restatement
(Third) §45(3) & cmt. d. Only that plaintiff can sue.
Self-appointed plaintiffs without a personal stake
cannot sue.
These rules requiring identification of the source
of defendant’s enrichment, or the appropriate heir in
the slayer-rule cases, control who can be a plaintiff.
Usually lawyers and judges think of these rules as
simply part of the substantive law of restitution and
unjust enrichment — just as in compensatory damages cases, they are more likely to think of the
requirement that plaintiff suffer damages as part of
his substantive claim than as a standing rule.
But when the wrong plaintiff tries to sue, or when
an unusual plaintiff asserts that special circumstances give him the right to sue, then the court may
talk about the identity of the restitution plaintiff in
terms of standing. An example is Fuchs v. Bidwill, 359
N.E.2d 158 (Ill. 1976), where the court held that
citizens and taxpayers lacked standing to sue on
behalf of the state for restitution of corrupt profits
allegedly earned by state legislators. Id. at 162. The
state could have sued, but individual citizens and
taxpayers could not.
Standing to sue depends on the “type of relief”
sought. Summers, 555 U.S. at 493. The proper rule of
standing in claims for restitution of unjust enrichment is that plaintiff have a personal stake in defendant’s gains, and in all but the exceptional case of the
slayer rule, that defendant’s gains were acquired by
violating plaintiff’s legal rights.
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C. Standing in Claims Specific to an Individual Plaintiff or General to the Whole
Public.
Restitution claims without harm, and tort claims
without harm, are examples of standing based on
violation of an individual legal right that is specific, or
“particularized,” to the plaintiff. Lujan, 504 U.S. at
560. In such a case, there is individualized injury in
the loss of plaintiff’s individualized right.
The search for some injury or harm beyond the
alleged violation developed in public-law cases where
plaintiffs challenged government policies that did not
actually apply to them. Thus in Summers, plaintiff
sued to enjoin implementation of certain rules by
which the Forest Service managed the national
forests. In Lujan, plaintiffs challenged the government’s failure to protect endangered species outside
the United States. In Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S.
765 (2000), the Court held that a private plaintiff’s
standing to recover damages suffered by the
government depended on an implicit assignment from
the government. But here too, plaintiff alleged only
that a state agency had misreported labor costs to the
federal government. Id. at 770. In these and many
similar public-law cases, the challenged rule or
practice did not regulate plaintiffs or interfere with
any individualized right of plaintiffs. No right in any
way personal or specific to plaintiffs had been
violated. See Resp. Br. 35, 37.
Where the alleged violation is in no way personal
to plaintiff, the Court’s cases require plaintiff to show
that the violation caused a further individualized
injury that is personal to plaintiff. Otherwise, plaintiff
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would have no more standing to sue than any other
American, and the concern with courts exercising a
general power to supervise the political branches
would be at its maximum. Congress cannot by statute
confer on individuals the right to assert generalized
grievances or enforce public rights that belong to the
people as a whole. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74, 578.
That is the principle on which petitioner relies. But
this case does not fit within the principle.
What Congress can do is create new and individualized “legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
The “injury in fact” that is “the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” is “invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (emphasis
added; quotation marks omitted); see Resp. Br. 25.
We know petitioner understands the significance
of this definition — because they changed it in their
opening quotation. Petitioner substituted “harm” for
“invasion of a legally protected interest,” placing
“harm” just outside the quotation marks. Pet. Br. 2.
But Lujan requires only “an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized.” 504 U.S. at 560. It does not require
additional or consequential harm.
Respondent claims a particularized statutory right
not to have false consumer-credit information published about him. The statute imposes liability for
“willfully” failing to use “reasonable procedures to
assure maximum possible accuracy of the information
concerning the individual about whom the report
relates.” 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a), §1681e(b) (emphasis
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added). This right is “concrete and particularized,”
and allegedly, it has been willfully violated. False
consumer-credit information about respondent, published in violation of that right, is injury in fact. This
Court’s cases require no more. Petitioner cites no case
in which the Court held that loss of such an
individualized and personal right is insufficient to
confer standing.
There is an unambiguous holding in Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), where a tester
inquired about the availability of apartments in
defendant’s complex. As respondent explains, Resp.
Br. 27-28, the decision rested squarely on the statutory violation. “A tester who has been the object of a
misrepresentation made unlawful under § 804(d) has
suffered injury in precisely the form the statute was
intended to guard against, and therefore has standing
….” 455 U.S. at 373-74. The Court did not require
some additional “concrete harm” to follow from loss of
that statutory right. Plaintiff did not want an apartment and had no use for truthful information. Petitioner’s claim that the case depends on some special
rule about “discrimination” as inherently injurious,
whether or not it has any further consequences, Pet.
Br. 41, has no basis in the opinion. What the Court
unanimously held is that loss of an individualized
statutory right, without more, is injury in fact.
There is a less pointed illustration in Clapper v.
Amnesty International USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
Plaintiffs alleged that government surveillance of
foreigners created a substantial risk that plaintiffs’
international communications would be unconstitutionally intercepted. The Court held that this risk was
too speculative to support standing. But the issue was
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simply the certainty or substantiality of the threat
that a communication would be intercepted. The
Court did not suggest that an individual whose
communications were sufficiently threatened with
interception would also have to show that he would
suffer some further harm resulting from that interception. The Fourth Amendment right to security in
one’s own communications is an individualized right,
and violation of that right would be injury in fact.
Just as Congress can enact new individualized
rights, so it can make those rights enforceable. Where
compensatory damages are often small or hard to
quantify, legislatures may authorize statutory minimum damages so that individuals will have a workable remedy when their rights are violated. Standing
in such cases depends on a claim that plaintiff’s
individualized right was violated — that he lost that
to which he was personally entitled under the statute
— and that he satisfies any other prerequisites to the
statutory remedy. The prerequisites to standing to
seek this statutory remedy depend on the elements of
the statutory claim, just as the prerequisites to
standing to seek compensatory damages, injunctions,
or restitution depend on the elements of those claims.
What standing for all these remedies has in common
is an actual or threatened “invasion of a legally
protected interest which is … concrete and particularized.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
III. Petitioner Obfuscates What It Means by
Injury and Harm.
Petitioner argues that plaintiffs who suffer no
“concrete harm” have no standing to sue in federal
court, even if their individual rights were violated.
But petitioner never defines “harm.” Petitioner obfus-
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cates the meanings of “injury” and “harm” in
unsuccessful efforts to hide the radical implications of
its proposed rule and to distinguish the many cases
that do not fit that rule.
Petitioner tries to explain away a few of the causes
of action reviewed in part I of this brief. It ignores all
the others. The heart of its argument is that loss of
plaintiff’s statutory right, without more, is not
“concrete harm.” Pet. Br. 14-17.
But then petitioner says that violation of rights
under a contract, without more, is concrete harm. Id.
at 26. Violation of rights under a trust, without more,
is concrete harm. Ibid. Petitioner’s apparent reason is
that these rights were created by judges, not legislatures.
And then petitioner concedes that some statutory
rights are also actionable without any harm beyond
the violation of the right. Petitioner says that infringement of copyrights and patents, without more, is
concrete harm, because those statutory rights built on
older common-law rights. Id. at 46 n.9, 49. Petitioner
appears to concede that plaintiffs under the Freedom
of Information Act need show only that they “sought
and were denied specific agency records” — not that
failure to get the records would cause some further
harm. Id. at 43 (quoting Public Citizen v. United
States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449
(1989)). That statutory right is said to build on
mandamus. Pet. Br. 44.
But when Congress creates a new right not
sufficiently “rooted in the common law,” that is a mere
“fiat.” Id. at 16, 46 n.9, 49. Loss of that statutory right
is not an injury; plaintiffs must show some further
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harm, apparently some consequential damage from
the loss of their statutory right.
Nothing underlies this distinction between
common-law and statutory rights but hostility to
Congress. Judges create real rights, loss of which is an
injury, but the elected representatives of the people
cannot create such rights. This distinction has no
possible justification. “[T]here is absolutely no basis
for making the Article III inquiry turn on the source
of the asserted right.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576.
Petitioner is forced to offer other ad hoc distinctions as well. It says that trespass to land is actionable
without concrete harm because repeated trespasses
might eventually create an easement. Pet. Br. 25-26.
But plaintiff can recover for a single trespass; proof
that defendant threatens to repeat the trespass is
required only if plaintiff seeks an injunction. See
Dobbs, Torts, §56 at 148-49. The prospect of continued
controversy is sometimes what motivates plaintiff to
sue, but continuing controversy has never been a
prerequisite to the claim.
To explain damages for loss of the right to vote,
petitioner implausibly claims that voting is a property
right. Pet. Br. 25; but see Resp. Br. 18-19.
Petitioner misdescribes Havens Realty, emphasizing a harm the Court never mentioned to avoid
recognizing the loss of the statutory right to truthful
information that the Court relied on. See supra at 30.
Petitioner also misstates Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247 (1978), implying that standing to sue for nominal
damages depended on plaintiffs’ allegations that they
lost “educational benefits” when they were suspended
from school without due process. Pet. Br. 46 n.9. Not
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so. If a hearing would have prevented plaintiffs’
suspensions, they could have recovered actual
“damages to compensate them for the injuries caused
by the suspensions.” 435 U.S. at 260. Nominal
damages were authorized on the explicit assumption
that there was no such loss. Id. at 266. “[T]he denial
of procedural due process should be actionable for
nominal damages without proof of actual injury.” Ibid.
Violation of plaintiffs’ individualized right to due
process — and nothing more — supported the claim.
To mask the radical implications of its proposed
rule, petitioner finds harm in bare violations of law in
various cases that it cannot distinguish — contract,
trust, trespass, patent, copyright, discrimination,
FOIA. Petitioner concedes that violation of these legal
rights, without more, is concrete harm and injury in
fact.
But petitioner cannot explain why violation of
respondent’s individualized right is not injury in just
the same way. Respondent alleges that petitioner
willfully failed to follow reasonable procedures to
assure the accuracy of its information and that consequently, it published “information” that specifically,
individually, and falsely described respondent.
Congress created a statutory right that protects
individuals from such false publications about them;
violation of that right is an injury in fact. All that
petitioner ultimately appears to say is that legislatively created rights are an inferior set of rights that
do not count.
There is no difference in the magnitude of the
interests at stake. An individual may well care more
about Spokeo publishing false but arguably positive
credit and employment information about him to the
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whole world than he cares about a trespasser’s
harmless entry upon his land. An applicant can lose
the job for being over-qualified; a suitor can lose a
woman if she reads that he is married. When all the
obfuscation and fallacious distinctions are stripped
away, petitioner’s argument boils down to hostility to
Congress and to its view that the individual right
Congress created is not worth protecting. This is an
objection to the statutory remedy. It is not an
argument about standing.
CONCLUSION
The judgment below should be affirmed. And the
Court’s opinion should take care to preserve the longestablished law of restitution and unjust enrichment.
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